E 

417 


UC-NRLF 


MILITARY  ORDER 

OF  THE 

LOYAL  LEGION 

OF  THE 

UNITED  STATES 


COMMANDERY  OF  THE 
STATE  OF  MISSOURI 


'Battle  of  Spring  fill, 


Military  Order 


OF  THE 


Loyal  Legion  of  the  United  States 


COMMANDERY   OF   THE 
STATE    OF    MISSOURI 


The    Battle   of    Spring    Hill,    Tennessee 

PREPARED    BY 

Companion  Captain  John  K.   Shellenberger 


READ    AFTER    THE 
STATED    MEETING 
HELD    FEBRU 
ARY  2d,  1907 


PREFACE. 

MORE  than  twenty-five  years  have  passed  since  I  began 
to  collect  the  materials  from  which  this  pamphlet  has 
been  evolved.    As  a  substantial  basis,  to  begin  with,  I 
was  an  eye-witness  of  all  the  fighting  in  the  vicinity  of  Spring  Hill, 
that  amounted  to  anything,  from  the  time  Forrest  attacked  the 
64th  Ohio  on  the  skirmish  line  until  Cleburne's  Division  recoiled 
from  the  fire  of  the  battery  posted  at  the  village. 

Since  I  began  collecting  I  have  neglected  no  opportunity  to 
increase  my  stock  of  information  by  conversation,  reading  or  cor 
respondence.  I  have  twice  revisited  the  battlefield.  I  have  the 
Government  volume  containing  the  official  reports,  all  of  which  I 
have  carefully  studied.  Among  my  correspondents,  on  the  Union 
side,  have  been  Generals  Stanley,  Wilson,  Opdycke,  Lane  and 
Bradley,  besides  many  others  of  lesser  rank.  I  am  as  confident, 
from  their  letters,  that  my  paper  would  have  the  approval  of  those 
named,  who  are  now  dead,  as  I  am  sure  it  has  the  approval  of 
General  Wilson,  to  whom  a  manuscript  copy  was  submitted  for 
criticism. 

Among  other  Confederates,  I  wrote  to  General  S.  D.  Lee, 
who  referred  me  to  Judge  J.  P.  Young,  of  Memphis  Tennessee, 
with  the  statement  that  he  had  exhausted  the  subject  on  the 
Confederate  side.  He  was  present  at  Spring  Hill  as  a  boy  soldier 
in  Forrest's  cavalry,  and  for  years  has  been  engaged  in  writ 
ing  a  history  of  the  Confederate  Army  of  Tennessee,  to  which  he 
has  given  an  enormous  amount  of  careful  research.  To  him  I  am 
indebted  for  much  of  the  most  valuable  part  of  my  information 
concerning  the  Confederate  troops.  From  the  materials  thus  gath 
ered  I  have  tried  to  give,  within  the  compass  of  a  Loyal  Legion 
paper,  a  clear  and  truthful  account  of  the  affair  just  as  it  hap 
pened.  That  opinions  will  differ,  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  Judge 

3 G 6231 


Young  holds  General  Brown  responsible  for  the  Confederate 
failure,  while  I  believe  that  Cheatham,  Stewart  and  Bate  were  all 
greater  sinners  than  Brown.  He  was  acting  under  the  eye  of 
Cheatham,  who  could  easily  have  forced  an  attack  by  Brown's 
Division  if  he  had  been  equal  .to  the  occasion. 

By  a  curious  coincidence  General  Lee  was  present  as  the  guest 
of  the  Missouri  Commandery  at  the  meeting  when  the  paper  was 
read,  and,  in  commenting  on  it,  General  Lee  stated  that  I  had  told 
the  truth  about  as  it  had  occurred.  The  deductions  made  from 
the  facts  stated  are  my  own. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SPRING  HILL. 

IT  may  be  fairly  claimed  that  the  success  of  General  Sherman's 
famous  March  to  the  Sea  hung  on  the  issue  of  a  minor  battle 
fought  at  Spring  Hill,  in  Middle  Tennessee,  the  evening  of 
November  29th,  1864,  when  Sherman  and  his  army  were  hun 
dreds  of  miles  away  in  the  heart  of  Georgia.  It  will  be  remem 
bered  that  when  Sherman  started  from  Atlanta  for  Savannah  his 
old  antagonist,  General  Hood,  was  at  Florence,  Alabama,  refitting 
his  army  to  the  limit  of  the  waning  resources  of  the  Confederacy, 
for  an  aggressive  campaign  into  Tennessee.  If  Hood's  campaign 
had  proved  successful  Sherman's  unopposed  march  through  Geor 
gia  would  have  been  derided  as  a  crazy  freak,  and,  no  doubt,  the 
old  charge  of  insanity  would  have  been  revived  against  him.  By 
how  narrow  a  margin  Hood  missed  a  brilliant  success,  a  truthful 
account  of  the  Spring  Hill  affair  will  disclose.  Much  has  been 
written  by  interested  generals  of  both  sides,  and  by  their  partisan 
friends,  to  mislead  as  to  the  real  situation.  With  no  personal 
friendships  or  enmities  to  subserve,  it  is  the  intention  of  this  paper 
to  tell  the  truth  without  any  regard  to  its  effect  on  the  reputation 
of  any  general,  Federal  or  Confederate. 

The  Administration  gave  a  reluctant  consent  to  Sherman's  plan 
on  the  condition  that  he  would  leave  with  General  Thomas,  com 
manding  in  Tennessee,  a  force  strong  enough  to  defeat  Hood.  On 
paper  Thomas  had  plenty  of  men,  but  Sherman  had  taken  his 
pick  of  infantry,  cavalry,  artillery  and  transportation,  leaving  the 
odds  and  ends  with  Thomas,  consisting  largely  of  post  troops  gar 
risoning  towns ;  bridge  guards  in  block-houses  along  the  rail 
roads  ;  new  regiments  recruited  by  the  payment  of  the  big  boun 
ties  that  produced  the  infamous  tribe  of  bounty  jumpers ;  negro 
regiments  never  yet  tested  in  battle;  green  drafted  men  assigned 
to  some  of  the  old,  depleted  regiments  in  such  large  numbers  as  to 
change  their  veteran  character ;  dismounted  cavalrymen  sent  back 
to  get  horses,  and  convalescents  and  furloughed  men  belonging 
to  the  army  with  Sherman  who  had  come  up  too  late  to  join  their 
commands,  organized  into  temporary  companies  and  regiments. 

Moreover,  Thomas'  forces  were  scattered  from  East  Tennessee 
to  Central  Missouri,  where  General  A.  J.  Smith,  with  two  divis- 


ions  of  the  Sixteenth  corps,  was  marching  for  St.  Louis  to  take 
steamboats  to  join  Thomas  at  Nashville.  The  only  force  available 
for  immediate  field  service  consisted  of  the  Fourth  and  the  Twen 
ty-third  corps,  the  two  weakest  corps  of  Sherman's  army,  which 
he  had  sent  back  to  Thomas.  These  two  corps,  temporarily  com 
manded  by  General  Schofield,  were  thrown  well  forward  towards 
Florence  to  delay  Hood  long  enough  for  Thomas  to  concentrate 
and  organize  from  his  widely  scattered  resources  a  force  strong 
enough  to  give  battle  to  Hood. 

Passing  over  all  prior  operations  we  will  take  up  the  situation 
as  it  was  the  morning  of  November  29th.  General  Schofield  had 
then  well  in  hand  on  the  north  bank  of  Duck  River,  opposite  Co 
lumbia,  Tennessee,  the  divisions  of  Kimball,  Wagner  and  Wood, 
composing  the  Fourth  corps,  and  of  Cox  and  Ruger,  of  the  Twen 
ty-third  corps,  Ruger's  lacking  one  brigade  on  detached  service. 
Across  the  river  were  two  divisions  of  General  S.  D.  Lee's  corps 
of  Hood's  Army.  The  preceding  evening  Hood,  himself,  with  the 
corps  of  Cheatham  and  Stewart,  and  Johnson's  division  of  Lee's 
corps,  had  moved  up  the  river  five  and  one-half  miles  to  Davis' 
ford,  where  he  was  laying  his  pontoons  preparatory  to  crossing. 
His  plan  was  to  detain  Schofield  at  the  river  by  feinting  with  two 
divisions  while  he  would  lead  seven  division's  past  the  left  flank 
and  plant  them  across  Schofield's  line  of  retreat  at  Spring  Hill, 
twelve  miles  north  of  Duck  River.  As  Hood  greatly  outnumbered 
Schofield,  his  plan  contemplated  the  destruction  of  Schofield's 
army. 

'  During  the  evening  of  the  28th  General  Wilson,  commanding 
our  cavalry,  had  learned  enough  of  Hood's  movement  to  divine 
its  purpose.  In  view  of  its  vital  importance,  to  insure  a  delivery, 
he  sent  a  message  in  triplicate,  each  courier  riding  by  a  separate 
road,  informing  Schofield  of  what  Hood  was  doing,  and  advising 
and  urging  him  to  get  back  to  Spring  Hill  with  all  his  army  by  10 
o'clock,  the  29th.  General  Wilson  has  stated  that  his  couriers  all 
got  through,  the  one  riding  by  the  shortest  road  reaching  Scho 
field's  headquarters  at  3  a.  m.  of  the  29th. 

From  the  reports  sent  him  by  Wilson,  General  Thomas  at  Nash 
ville  had  also  correctly  divined  Hood's  intention,  and  in  a  dis 
patch  dated  at  3  130  a.  m.,  of  the  29th — but  by  the  neglect  of  the 
night  operator  not  transmitted  until  6  o'clock,  when  the  day  oper 
ator  came  on  duty — he  ordered  Schofield  to  fall  back  to  Franklin, 
leaving  a  sufficient  force  at  Spring  Hill  to  delay  Hood  until  he 
was  securely  posted  at  Franklin. 


I  was  commanding  Company  B,  64th  Ohio  Regiment,  Bradley'?, 
brigade,  Wagner's  division.  The  brigade  was  under  arms  that 
morning  by  4  o'clock,  and  had  orders  to  be  ready  to  march  on  a 
moment's  notice.  It  is  assumed  that  all  the  rest  of  the  army  re 
ceived  the  same  orders,  and  that  this  action  was  taken  on  account 
of  the  information  brought  by  Wilson's  courier  at  3  o'clock.  But 
nothing  was  done  until  8  o'clock,  when  the  movements  began 
which  disposed  of  our  army  as  follows  : 

Wagner's  division  was  sent  to  Spring  Hill  to  guard  the  reserve 
artillery  and  the  wagon  trains,  all  ordered  to  Spring  Hill,  from 
any  raid  by  Hood's  cavalry.  General  Stanley,  the  corps  com 
mander,  went  with  Wagner.  Cox's  division  was  posted  along  the 
river,  and  was  engaged  all  day  in  skirmishing  with  the  two  divis 
ions  under  Lee,  which  kept  up  a  noisy  demonstration  of  forcing  a 
crossing.  Ruger's  two  brigades  were  posted  four  miles  north  of 
Duck  river,  where  the  pike  to  Spring  Hill  crosses  Rutherford's 
creek,  to  hold  that  crossing.  The  divisions  of  Kimball  and  Wood 
were  aligned  between  Cox  and  Ruger,  facing  up  the  river  towards 
Hood's  crossing.  At  9  o'clock  Post's  brigade,  of  Wood's  division, 
was  sent  up  the  river  to  reconnoiter,  and  before  n  o'clock  Post 
had  reached  a  position  where  he  could  see  Hood's  column  march 
ing  towards  Spring  Hill,  and  repeatedly  reported  that  fact. 

Nevertheless  none  of  the  four  divisions  near  Duck  river  were 
started  for  Spring  Hill  until  after  4  o'clock,  when  Schofield  had 
heard  from  Stanley  that  Hood  was  attacking  at  Spring  Hill. 

After  the  campaign  Schofield  claimed  that  its  success  was  due 
to  his  intimate  knowledge  of  Hood's  character,  gained  while  they 
were  classmates  at  West  Point,  which  enabled  him  to  foresee  what 
Hood  would  do  under  any  given  conditions,  and  then  make  the 
best  dispositions  for  defeating  him.  When,  two  months  later, 
Schofield  was  in  Washington,  where  they  knew  nothing  about  the 
details  of  the  campaign,  he  so  successfully  impressed  his  claim  on 
the  Administration  that  he  was  given  the  same  promotion  with 
which  General  Sheridan  had  been  rewarded  for  the  victory  at 
Winchester,  jumping  at  one  bound  from  the  rank  of  captain  to 
that  of  brigadier-general  in  the  regular  army.  But  it  is  plain  that 
after  five  hours'  .of  deliberation  that  morning  Schofield  had 
reached  a  wrong  conclusion  as  to  Hood's  intention,  for  if  "Actions 
speak  louder  than  words,"  there  can  be  no  question  that  Scho- 
field's  dispositions  were  made  under  the  conviction  that  Hood 
would  march  down  the  river,  after  crossing,  to  clear  the  way  for 
Lee  to  cross.  And  so  deeply  infatuated  was  he  with  this'self- 

7 


imposed  delusion  that,  disregarding  the  order  of  Thomas  and  the 
advice  of  Wilson,  he  cherished  it  for  about  five  hours  after  Post 
had  reported  that  Hood  was  marching  towards  Spring  Hill. 

Wagner's  advance,  double-quicking  through  Spring  Hill  at 
noon,  and  deploying  just  beyond  on  a  run,  interposed  barely  in 
time  to  head  off  the  advance  of  Hood's  cavalry,  Wagner  arriving 
by  the  Columbia  pike  from  the  southwest  and  the  cavalry  by  the 
Mount  Carmel  road  from  the  east.  General  Forrest,  commanding 
Hood's  cavalry,  had  used  his  superior  numbers  so  skillfully  as  to 
push  back  Wilson  with  our  cavalry  just  north  of  Mount  Carmel, 
which  is  five  miles  east  of  Spring  Hill,  before  noon.  Leaving  one 
brigade  to  watch  Wilson,  Forrest  then  crossed  over  to  Spring  Hill 
with  all  the  rest  of  his  three  divisions  of  cavalry.  If  Wagner  had 
arrived  a  few  minutes  later  he  would  have  found  Forrest  in  pos 
session  at  Spring  Hill. 

General  Cox,  in  his  book  on  this  campaign,  claims  that  General 
Wilson  committed  a  grave  error  in  not  crossing  over  to  Spring 
Hill,  in  advance  of  Forrest,  with  all  our  cavalry.  But  in  justice 
to  Wilson  it  must  be  remembered  that  at  Mount  Carmel  he  acted 
under  the  belief  that  Schofield  was  following  the  advice  he  had 
given  early  that  morning.  If  Schofield  had  been  at  Spring  Hill 
at  10  o'clock,  as  Wilson  had  advised,  with  all  his  infantry,  what 
reason  could  there  have  been  for  the  cavalry  joining  him  there  ? 

When  Bradley's  brigade,  the  rear  of  Wagner's  column,  was 
Hearing  Spring  Hill  some  of  the  cavalry  approached  the  pike 
through  the  fields  to  reconnoiter,  and  the  64th  Ohio  was  sent  to 
drive  them  away.  With  the  right  wing  deployed  as  skirmishers 
and  the  left  wing  in  reserve,  the  regiment  advanced  steadily,  driv 
ing  before  it  the  cavalry,  without  replying  to  the  harmless  long- 
range  fire  they  kept  up  with  their  carbines,  but  always  galloping 
away  before  we  could  get  within  effective  range.  About  a  mile 
east  of  the  pike  we  crossed  the  Rally  Hill  road.  This  was  the 
road  by  which  Hood's  infantry  column  approached.  It  there  runs 
north  nearly  parallel  with  the  pike  to  a  point  500  yards  east  of 
Spring  Hill,  where  it  turns  west  to  enter  the  village.  Leaving  one 
of  the  reserve  companies  to  watch  the  road,  the  rest  of  the  regi 
ment  kept  on  in  pursuit  of  the  cavalry  until  our  skirmishers  were 
abreast  of  the  Caldwell  house,  about  800  yards  east  of  the  road, 
when  a  halt  was  called.  A  few  minutes  later,  at  2  130  o'clock,  the 
left  of  our  skirmish  line,  north  of  the  Caldwell  house,  was  at 
tacked  by  a  line  of  battle  in  front  while  the  cavalry  worked  around 
our  left  flank.  At  the  time  we  believed  the  battle  line  to  be  a  part 

8 


of  Hood's  infantry,  and  in  a  letter  from  General  Bradley  he  states 
that  it  caused  great  consternation  at  headquarters  in  Spring  Hill 
when  Major  Coulter,  of  the  64th,  came  galloping  back  with  the 
information  that  the  regiment  was  fighting  with  infantry.  But 
investigation  has  disclosed  that  the  battle  line  was  composed  of 
mounted  infantry  belonging  to  Forrest's  command.  They  were 
armed  with  Enfield  rifles,  and  always  fought  on  foot  like  ordinary 
infantry,  using  their  horses  for  traveling  rapidly  from  place  to 
place. 

The  four  reserve  companies  were  thrown  in  on  a  run  at  the  point 
of  contact,  but  our  line  was  soon  forced  to  fall  back  by  the  cavalry 
turning  our  left  flank,  where  they  cut  off  and  captured  three  of 
our  skirmishers.  One  of  the  three  was  badly  wounded  that  even 
ing  in  trying  to  escape,  a  bullet  entering  from  behind  and  passing 
through  his  mouth  in  a  way  to  knock  out  nearly  one-half  of  all  his 
teeth.     We  found  him  in  a  hospital  at  Spring  Hill  when  passing 
through  in  pursuit  of  Hood's  army  after  the  victory  at  Nashville. 
In  relating  his  experience  he  stated  that  when  they  were  captured 
they  were  taken  before  some  general,  name  unknown  to  him,  who 
questioned  them  closely  as  to  what  force  was  holding  Spring  Hill. 
The  general  was  probably  Forrest,  for  he  was  personally  directing 
the  attack  on  the  64th,  but  may  have  been  Hood  himself,  for  he 
was  on  the  Rally  Hill  road,  less  than  a  mile  away,  soon  after  the 
men  were  captured.     They  all  declared  that  they  knew  the  Fourth 
corps  was  at  Spring  Hill,  and  they  believed  all  the  rest  of  the 
army.  Their  declaration  must  have  carried  greater  weight  on  ac 
count  of  their  own  faith  in  what  they  were  telling,  for  at  that  time 
the  whole  regiment  believed  that  all  the  rest  of  the  army  had  fol 
lowed  to  Spring  Hill  close  on  the  heels  of  Wagner's  division. 

Eventually  the  64th  was  driven  back  across  the  Rally  Hill  road, 
where  a  last  stand  was  made  in  a  large  woods  covering  a  broad 
ridge  abutting  on  the  road  about  three-fourths  of  a  mile  southeast 
of  Spring  Hill.  While  in  these  woods,  occurred  a  bit  of  exciting 
personal  experience.  A  bullet,  coming  from  the  right,  passed 
through  my  overcoat,  buttoned  up  to  my  chin,  in  a  way  to  take 
along  the  top  button  of  my  blouse  underneath  the  coat.  That  big 
brass  button  struck  me  a  stinging  blow  on  the  point  of  the  left 
collar-bone,  and,  clasping  both  hands  to  the  spot,  I  commenced 
feeling  for  the  hole  with  my  finger  tips,  fully  convinced  that  a 
bullet  coming  from  the  front  had  gone  through  me  there  and  had 
inflicted  a  serious  and  possibly  a  mortal  wound.  It  was  not  until 
I  had  opened  the  coat  for  a  closer  investigation  that  'I  found  I  was 


worse  scared  than  hurt.  Some  of  the  enemy  -had  secured  a  posi 
tion  on  our  right  flank,  where  they  opened  an  enfilading  fire,  and 
it  was  one  of  their  bullets  that  had  hit  me.  To  get  out  of  that  fire 
the  regiment  fell  back  towards  the  interior  of  the  woods,  where  it 
was  so  close  to  our  main  line  that  it  was  called  in. 

It  was  then  about  3  130  o'clock,  and  by  that  time  the  situation  of 
our  army  had  become  so  critical  that  nothing  short  of  the  grossest 
blundering  on  the  part  of  the  enemy  could  save  it  from  a  great 
disaster,  and  there  was  a  fine  possibility  for  destroying  it. 

Wagner's  division  had  so  much  property  to  protect  that  it  was 
stretched  out  on  a  line  extending  from  the  railway  station,  nearly 
a  mile  northwest  of  Spring  Hill,  where  two  trains  of  cars  were 
standing  on  the  track,  around  by  the  north,  east  and  south,  to  the 
Columbia  pike  on  the  southwest.  Behind  this  long  line  the  vil 
lage  streets  and  the  adjacent  fields  were  crammed  with  nearly 
everything  on  wheels  belonging  to  our  army — ambulances,  artil 
lery  carriages  and  army  wagons  to  the  number  of  about  800  vehi 
cles.  The  nearest  support  wras  Ruger's  two  brigades,  eight  miles 
away,  and  it  was  about  an  hour  later  before  Ruger  had  started  for 
Spring  Hill.  Opdycke's  brigade  was  covering  the  railway  sta 
tion  and  the  Franklin  pike  on  the  north,  and  Lane's  brigade  the 
Mount  Carmel  road  on  the  east.  They  had  a  connected  line,  but 
it  was  so  long  that  much  of  it  consisted  of  skirmishers  only.  They 
had  in  their  front  detachments  of  Forrest's  cavalry  feeling  along 
their  line  for  an  opening  to  get  at  the  trains.  Bradley's  brigade 
occupied  an  advanced,  detached  position,  on  the  ridge  to  the  south 
east  that  has  been  mentioned,  to  cover  the  approach  by  the  Rally 
Hill  road.  There  was  a  gap  of  half  a  mile  between  Lane's  right 
in  front  of  Spring  Hill  and  Bradley's  left,  out  on  the  ridge.  Brad 
ley  had  in  his  immediate  front  the  main  body  of  Forrest's  three 
divisions  of  cavalry  and  the  three  divisions  of  infantry  composing 
Cheatham's  corps,  while  four  more  divisions  of  infantry  were 
within  easy  supporting  distance.  In  brief,  ten  of  the  twelve  divis 
ions,  cavalry  included,  composing  Hood's  army,  were  in  front  of 
Spring  Hill,  and  at  4  o'clock  Hood  was  attacking  with  his  in 
fantry  Wagner's  lone  division,  guarding  all  our  trains,  while 
Schofield  was  still  waiting  for  Hood  at  Duck  river  with  four 
divisions  from  eight  to  twelve  miles  away.  If  Wagner's  division 
had  been  wiped  but,  a  very  easy  possibility  for  the  overwhelming 
numbers  confronting  it  while  stretched  out  on  a  line  about  three 
miles  long,  without  any  breastworks,  the  rich  prize  of  our  ambu 
lance  train,  six  batteries  of  artillery,  and  all  our  wagons  with  their 

10 


loads  of  supplies  would  have  fallen  into  Hood's  hands,  and  the 
retreat  of  the  four  divisions  would  have  been  squarely  cut  off, 
while  having  a  short  supply  of  artillery  and  no  food  or  ammuni 
tion  except  what  the  men  were  carrying  in  their  haversacks  and 
cartridge  boxes.  The  escape  of  our  army  from  this  deadly  peril 
was  largely  due  to  the  great  skill  with  which  General  Stanley 
handled  the  situation  at  Spring  Hill,  but  manifestly  no  amount  of 
skill  on  the  part  of  Stanley  could  have  saved  us,  where  the  disad 
vantages  were  so  great,  if  the  enemy  had  improved  with  a  very 
ordinary  degree  of  vigor  and  intelligence  the  opportunity  opened 
to  them  by  Schofield's  delusion  as  to  Hood's  intention.  General 
Hood  rode  with  the  advance  of  his  column  until  after  it  had 
crossed  Rutherford's  creek,  two  and  one-half  miles  south  of  Spring 
Hill.  It  was  then  about  3  o'clock.  There  was  no  bridge,  and  his 
men  had  to  wade  the  creek,  which  caused  some  delay.  A  short 
distance  north  of  the  crossing  Hood  met  Forrest,  and  got  his 
report  of  the  situation  at  Spring  Hill  as  he  had  developed  it  dur 
ing  the  three  hours  preceding.  He  had  met  with  resistance  on  so 
long  a  line  that  no  doubt  he  greatly  overestimated  the  force  hold 
ing  Spring  Hill,  and  such  an  estimate  would  agree  with  the  story 
told  by  the  captured  64th  men. 

On  the  other  hand,  a  courier  had  arrived  with  a  report  from 
Lee  that  Schofield's  main  body  was  still  in  his  front  at  Duck  river, 
and  Lee's  report  was  confirmed  by  the  sounds  of  the  heavy  can 
nonading  that  had  been  coming  from  his  direction.  These  reports 
disclosed  that  a  part  of  Schofield's  army  was  at  Spring  Hill  and 
a  part  at  Duck  river,  but  they  conflicted  as  to  which  position  was 
held  by  his  main  body.  In  the  uncertainty  thus  arising  Hood 
decided,  as  his  dispositions  clearly  show,  that  his  first  move  must 
be  to  plant  Cheatham's  corps  on  the  pike  between  those  two  parts. 
Developments  would  then  determine  his  next  move.  Cleburne's 
division  was  the  first  to  cross  the  creek,  and  marching  up  the  road 
until  his  advance  was  close  to  the  woods  where  Forrest's  men 
were  fighting  with  the  64th  Ohio,  Cleburne  halted  and  formed  his 
battle  line  along  the  road  facing  west  towards  the  Columbia  pike. 
If  the  intention  had  been  to  make  a  direct  attack,  his  line  would 
have  formed  facing  north  towards  our  line  in  the  woods,  where 
its  position  had  been  developed  by  Forrest.  The  intention  un 
questionably  was  for  Cleburne,  avoiding  any  encounter  with  our 
line  in  the  woods,  first  to  cross  over  to  the  pike  and  then  change 
direction  and  advance  on  Spring  Hill  astride  the  pike,  while  Bate's 
division,  following  Cleburne's,  received  orders  as  reported  by 

11 


Bate,  to  cross  to  the  pike  and  then  sweep  down  the  pike  towards 
Columbia.  Hood  himself  gave  the  orders  to  Cleburne  and  Bate, 
and  then  established  his  headquarters  at  the  Thompson  farm 
house,  near  by,  about  500  yards  west  of  the  Rally  Hill  road,  and 
nearly  two  miles  south  of  Spring  Hill,  where  he  remained  till  next 
morning.  To  save  time  Cleburne  started  for  the  pike  as  soon  as 
he  was  ready,  and  Bate,  then  forming  on  Cleburne's  left,  followed 
as  soon  as  his  formation  was  completed. 

While  Cleburne  and  Bate  were  moving  out,  General  Cheatham 
was  at  the  crossing  hurrying  over  Brown's  division.  When  Brown 
got  over  he  could  support  either  Cleburne  or  Bate,  as  develop 
ments  might  dictate.  Uncandid  statements  have  been  made  that 
Cheatham's  divisions  were  moved  around  in  a  disjointed  manner 
and  without  any  plan.  There  was  not  only  a  logical  plan  but  a 
successful  plan,  if  it  had  been  carried  out,  in  the  orders  given  to 
Cheatham's  divisions.  The  other  four  divisions  were  halted  south 
of  Rutherford's  creek,  and  fronted  into  line  facing- west  towards 
{he  Columbia  pike.  This  proves  that  it  was  then  Hood's  belief 
that  Schofield's  main  body  was  still  at  Duck  river.  If  it  should 
march  up  the  pike  and  attack  Bate,  the  four  divisions  would  be  on 
its  flank.  If  it  should  attempt  to  reach  the  fortifications  at  Mur- 
freesboro  by  cutting  across  the  country  south  of  Spring  Hill  the 
four  divisions  would  be  in  a  position  to  intercept  it. 

General  Bradley  had  four  regiments  in  line  in  the  woods  on  the 
ridge,  with  the  left  towards  the  Rally  Hill  road  and  the  right 
trending  away  towards  the  pike.  They  faced  in  a  southeasterly 
direction.  To  cover  more  ground  there  were  short  gaps  between 
the  regiments.  The  65th  Ohio  was  the  right  regiment  of  the  four, 
and  to  the  right  rear  of  the  65th  was  a  gap  of  a  couple  hundred 
yards  extending  out  into  cleared  land,  where  the  42d  Illinois  was 
posted,  refused  as  to  the  65th  and  facing  south  to  cover  that  flank. 
To  the  front,  right  and  rear  of  the  42d  was  a  broad  expanse  of 
rolling  fields  extending  on  the  right  to  the  pike,  about  1,000  yards 
away,  where  two  guns  were  posted  to  sweep  the  fields  in  front  of 
the  42d  with  their  fire.  To  the  left  of  the  42d  an  extension  of  the 
woods  ran  out  into  the  fields  and  concealed  the  42d  from  Cleburne 
until  he  had  advanced  almost  abreast  of  its  position.  When  the 
64th  came  off  the  skirmish  line  it  was  sent  to  the  support  of  the 
42d.  The  36th  Illinois,  Opdycke's  only  reserve,  was  hurried 
across  on  double-quick  from  the  other  side  of  Spring  Hill  to  sup 
port  the  two  guns  at  the  pike.  As  many  guns  of  the  reserve  artil 
lery  as  could  be  utilized  were  placed  in  battery  around  the  south- 

12 


easterly  skirt  of  the  village,  looking  towards  Bradley's  position. 
Bradley's  men  very  hastily  had  constructed  weak  barricades  of 
rails  or  anything  else  they  could  lay  their  hands  on.  The  42d  had 
such  protection  as  was  afforded  by  a  rail  fence. 

Shortly  before  4  o'clock,  having  completed  his  formation,  Cle- 
burne  started  to  march  across  to  the  pike.     His  division  consisted 
of  four  brigades,  but  one  was  on  detached  duty,  and  he  had  three 
in  line — Lowrey's  on  his  right,  then  Govan's,  then  Granbury's. 
First  crossing  a  field  in  his  front,  Lowrey  entered  the  extension  of 
the  woods  that  has  been  mentioned,  and  on  emerging  on  the  other 
side  his  right  came  in  view  within  easy  range  of  the  42d,  and  that 
regiment   opened   an    enfilading   fire,    Lowrey's    line   being   then 
almost  perpendicular  to  the  line  of  the  42d.     It  was  this  accident 
of  Lowrey's  right  passing  within  range  of  the  42d  that  led  to  the 
failure  of  Hood's  plan,  which,  up  to  that  minute,  had  been  a  great 
success.    When  the  42d  opened  fire  the  two  guns  at  the  pike  also 
opened,  their  fire  crossing  that  of  the  42d,  and  the  64th,  running 
forward  and  intermingling  ranks  with  the  42d,  poured  in  their 
fire.     When  our  fire  had  thus  developed  our  position,  out  in  those 
wide  fields  they  could  see  just  what  we  had.     They  pulled  down 
the  rims  of  their  old  hats  over  their  eyes,  bent  their  heads  to  the 
storm  of  missiles  pouring  upon  them,  changed  direction  to  their 
right  on  double-quick  in  a  manner  that  excited  our  admiration, 
and  a  little  later  a  long  line  came  sweeping  through  the  wide  gap 
between   the   right   of   the   42d   and   the   pike,   and   swinging  in 
towards  our  rear.    Our  line  stood  firm,  holding  back  the  enemy  in 
front  until  the  flank  movement  had  progressed  so  far  as  to  make 
it  a  question  of  legs  to  escape  capture  when  the  regimental  com 
manders  gave  the  reluctant  order  to  fall  back.     The  contact  was 
then  so  close  that  as  the  men  on  our  right  were  running  past  the 
line  closing  in  on  them  they  were  called  on  with  loud  oaths,  charg 
ing  them  with  a  Yankee  canine  descent,  to  halt  and  surrender; 
and,  not  heeding  the  call,  some  of  them  were  shot  down  with  the 
muzzles  of  the  muskets  almost  touching  their  bodies.      By  the 
recession  of  the  two  regiments  on  the  flank  the  rear  of  the  four 
regiments  in  the  woods  became  exposed.     They  were  attacked  at 
the  same  time  by  Forrest  in  front,  and  by  Cleburne  on  their  right 
and  rear,  and  were  speedily  dislodged.     The  attack  was  pressed 
with  so  much  vigor  that  in  a  few  minutes  after  the  42d  had  opened 
fire  Bradley's  entire  brigade  was  in  rapid  retreat  towards  Spring 
Hill,  with  Cleburne  in  close  pursuit,  and  pouring  in  a  hot  fire.    In 
falling  back  we  had  to  cross  the  valley  of  a  small  stream,  and  I 

13 


never  think  of  our  strenuous  exertions  to  get  out  of  a  destructive 
cross-fire,  while  running  down  the  easy  slope  leading  to  the 
stream,  without  recalling  the  story  of  the  officer  "who  called  to  a 
soldier  making  the  best  time  he  could  to  get  out  of  a  hot  fire : 
"Stop,  my  man!  What  are  you  running  for?" 

"Because  I  have  no  wings  to  fly  with,"  called  back  the  soldier 
over  his  shoulder  while  increasing  his  efforts  to  make  better  time. 
As  we  descended  into  the  valley  we  uncovered  our  pursuers  to 
the  fire  of  the  battery  at  the  village,  which  opened  with  shrapnel 
shells,  firing  over  our  heads.     General  Stanley,  who  was  in  the 
battery,  reported  that  not  less  than  eight  guns  opened  fire.     As 
soon  as  Cleburne  encountered  that  fire  he  hastily  drew  back  over 
the  ridge,  out  of  sight.  All  pursuit  with  its  accompanying  direct  and 
cross-fire  having  thus  ceased,  Bradley's  men  stopped  running  and 
walked  on  back  to  the  vicinity  of  the  battery  where  a  new  line  was 
formed  without  trouble  or  confusion.     When  coming  down  the 
slope  towards  the  stream  Major  Coulter,  whose  horse  had  been 
killed,  was  running  a  few  feet  in  front  of  me,  and  I  was  just  spec 
ulating  whether  my  short  legs  could  keep  up  with  his  long  ones, 
when  he  called  back  over  his  shoulder:     "Rally  at  this  fence," 
meaning  a  rail  fence  we  were  approaching.    I  had  a  poor  opinion 
of  the  fence  as  a  place  to  attempt  a  rally,  for  we  would  still  be 
exposed  to  a  cross-fire,  but  wishing  to  obey  orders  I  made  for  the 
strongest  looking  fence  corner  in  my  front,  and,  jumping  over 
and  stopping  behind  it,  looked  around  to  see  if  any  concerted 
effort  would  be  made  to  reform  behind  the  fence.     In  my  brief 
halt  there  I  had  some  opportunity  to  observe  the  effect  of  our 
artillery  fire  on  the  enemy.    I  saw  by  the  smoke  where  a  number 
of  our  shells  exploded,  and  they  all  seemed  too  high  in  the  air  and 
too  far  to  the  rear,  for  I  could  not  see  any  men  knocked  down  by 
them.   No  doubt  the  fear  of  killing  some  of  our  own  men  caused  our 
gunners  to  aim  high,  and  it  is  probable  that  the  noise  made  by  so 
many  guns  and  exploding  shells  had  more  to  do  with  stopping  the 
enemy  than  the   execution   that  was   done.     Their  after-actions 
showed  that  they  believed  Bradley's  brigade  to  have  been  an  out 
post  ;  that  our  main  line  was  where  the  battery  was  posted,  and 
that  so  much  artillery  must  have  a  correspondingly  strong  in 
fantry  support. 

General  Bradley  reported  a-  loss  of  198  men  in  his  brigade, 
nearly  all  of  it  falling  on  the  three  regiments  on  the  exposed  flank, 
the  other  three  regiments  falling  back  with  light  loss  because 
their  position  had  become  untenable.  He  was  disabled  with  a 

14 


wound,  and  Colonel  Conrad,  of  the  I5th  Missouri,  then  assumed 
command  of  the  brigade.  By  the  casualties  in  the  65th  Ohio  the 
command  of  that  regiment  devolved  upon  the  adjutant,  Brewer 
Smith,  a  boy  only  19  years  old,  and  possibly  the  youngest  officer 
to  succeed  to  the  command  of  a  regiment  throughout  the  war. 

A  regiment  of  the  23d  corps  which  had  come  to  Spring  Hill  as 
a  train  guard,  and  was  placed  in  support  of  the  battery  at  the 
village,  has  persistently  claimed  that  the  salvation  of  our  army 
was  due  to  the  heroic  stand  it  made  after  all  of  Wagner's  division 
had  run  away.  In  a  historical  sketch  of  the  regiment  occurs  this 
statement : 

"At  Spring  Hill  the  regiment  had  another  opportunity  to  show 
its  pluck.  A  division  that  had  been  sent  forward  in  charge  of  the 
trains  was  drawn  up  to  resist  any  attack  the  rebels  might  make 
while  the  regiment,  being  with  the  headquarters  train,  was  or 
dered  to  support  a  battery  so  placed  as  to  sweep  an  open  field  in 
front  of  the -troops.  The  enemy,  emerging  from  the  woods, 
marched  steadily  up  to  the  National  lines,  when  the  entire  divis 
ion  broke  and  ran."  That  is  pretty  strong  language  in  view  of 
the  battle  record  of  Wagner's  division,  for  of  the  four  brigades 
out  of  all  the  brigades  serving  in  all  the  Western  armies,  given 
prominent  mention  by  Colonel  Fox  in  his  book  on  regimental  losses 
as  famous  fighting  brigades,  two,  Opdycke's  and  Bradley's,  be 
longed  to  Wagner's  division,  to  say  nothing  of  the  very  awkward 
fact  that  the  brigades  of  Opdycke  and  Lane  were  on  the  other  side 
of  Spring  Hill,  out  of  sight  of  Cleburne's  attack,  but  it  is  seriously 
so  stated — "the  entire  division  broke  and  ran,  leaving  the  regi 
ment  and  the  battery  to  resist  the  attack.  Fixing  bayonets  the 
men  awaited  the  onset.  As  soon  as  the  enemy  came  within  range 
they  poured  a  well-directed  fire  into  their  ranks  which,  being 
seconded  by  the  battery,  caused  them  to  waver.  Portions  of  the 
retreating  division  having  rallied,  the  rebels  were  compelled  to 
betake  themselves  to  the  woods." 

And  in  a  paper  on  this  campaign  by  a  captain  of  the  regiment, 
he  relates  how  the  officers  of  the  regiment  tried  to  stop  the  flying 
troops,  and  taunted  their  officers  with  the  bad  example  they  were 
setting  their  men  ;  how  the  regiment  opened  a  rapid,  withering 
fire  from  a  little  para-pet  of  cartridges  which  the  officers,  breaking 
open  boxes  of  ammunition,  had  built  in  front  of  the  men,  and  how 
their  fire  proved  so  destructive  at  that  close  range  that  it  stopped 
Cheatham's  men  who  then  fell  back  and  commenced  building 
breastworks.  In  calling  them  Cheatham's  men,  did  the  captain 


15 


wish  to  insinuate  that  Cheatham's  whole  corps  was  charging  on 
the  regiment?  He  uses  the  words  "withering,"  "destructive"  and 
"that  close  range,"  in  a  way  to  raise  the  inference  that  the  contact 
was  very  close.  The  actual  distance  was  shrapnel-shell  range,  for 
the  battery  stopped  Cleburne  with  those  missiles  before  he  had 
crossed  the  little  stream  more  than  1,000  yards  away,  so  that  in 
stead  of  a  cool  regiment  of  exceptional  staying  qualities  delivering 
a  destructive  fire  at  very  close  range,  as  pictured  by  the  captain, 
the  truth  discloses  a  highly  excited,  not  to  say  a  badly  scared  regi 
ment,  wasting  ammunition  at  too  long  range  to  do  any  damage. 
That  this  was  the  truth  is  proved  by  the  very  significant  fact,  not 
deemed  worthy  of  mention  in  either  of  the  accounts  quoted,  that 
the  regiment  did  not  lose  a  single  man  killed  or  wounded ;  not  one, 
and  it  was  not  protected  by  breastworks.  With  impressive  mys 
tery  the  captain  describes  the  regiment  as  what  was  left  of  it  after 
the  way  it  had  been  cut  up  in  the  Atlantic  campaign,  with  the 
same  artful  vagueness  used  in  the  matter  of  the  range,  seeking  to 
create  the  inference  that  the  battle  losses  of  the  regiment  had  been 
very  extraordinary.  Again,  to  be  specific,  the  regiment  lost  in  its 
three  years'  term  of  service  two  officers  and  thirty-seven  men 
killed  or  died  of  wounds,  less  than  one-third  the  average  loss  of 
the  six  regiments  composing  Bradley's  brigade,  and  it  stands 
TOQth  among  the  infantry  regiments  of  its  State  in  the  number  of 
its  battle  losses,  or,  excepting  six  regiments  that  spent  most  of 
their  time  in  garrison  duty,  at  the  bottom  of  the  list  of  all  three 
years'  regiments  sent  from  the  State.  It  would  appear  that  the 
iO3d  Ohio  had  become  pretty  well  imbued  with  the  spirit  charac 
teristic  of  the  headquarters  with  which  it  was  associated,  to  claim 
credit  in  an  inverse  ratio  to  services  rendered. 

When  Cleburne  changed  direction  his  left  swung  in  so  close  to 
the  pike  that  the  two  guns  and  the  36th  Illinois  were  driven  away 
and  Cleburne  could  then  have  extended  his  left  across  the  pike 
without  meeting  with  any  further  opposition. 

Lowrey  and  Govan  made  the  change  in  line  of  battle  while 
Granbury  faced  to  the  right  and  followed  their  movement  in  col 
umn  of  fours.  Afterwards  Granbury  about  faced,  and  moving 
back  some  distance  in  column,  then  fronted  into  line  and  advanced 
to  a  farm  fence  paralleling  the  pike  at  a  distance  variously  stated 
at  from  80  to  100  yards.  His  line  there  halted  and  laid  down 
behind  the  fence.  Cleburne  and  Granbury  were  both  killed  next 
day,  and  it  is  not  known  why  Granbury  did  not  go  on  and  take 
possession  of  the  pike.  The  brigades  of  Lowrey  and  Govan  had 

16 


become  so  bady  mixed  up  in  the  pursuit  of  Bradley,  and  in  the 
recoil  from  the  fire  of  the  battery,  that  their  line  had  to  be  re 
formed.     When  this  was  accomplished  the  intrepid  Cleburne  was 
about  to  resume  his  attack  towards   Spring  Hill  when  he  was 
stopped  by  an  order  from  Cheatham,  who  had  brought  up  Brown's 
division  on  Cleburne's  right,  and  had  also  sent  a  staff  officer  to 
recall  Bate  with  an  order  for  him  to  close  up  and  connect  with 
Cleburne's  left.     This  proves  that  developments,  probably  the  fire 
of  so  many  guns  opening  on  Cleburne,  had  convinced  Cheatham 
that  the  force  holding  Spring  Hill  was  strong  enough  to  demand 
the  attention  of  his  entire  corps.     His  intention  was  for  Brown 
to  lead  in  an  attack,  Cleburne  to  follow  Brown,  and  Bate,  when  he 
got  up,  to  follow  Cleburne.     But  on  getting  into  position  Brown 
reported  to  Cheatham  that  he  was  out-flanked  several  hundred 
yards  on  his  right,  and  that  it  would  lead  to  inevitable  disaster 
for  him  to  attack.     The  97th  Ohio,  of  Lane's  brigade,  was  to  the 
left  of  the  battery,  in  front  of  Spring  Hill,  with  the  left  of  the 
97th  extending  towards  Mount  Carmel  road.     The  looth  Illinois 
was  on  the  other  side  of  the  road,  several  hundred  yards  in  ad 
vance  of  the  97th  Ohio,  and  the  two  regiments  were  connected 
by  a  part  of  the  4Oth  Indiana  deployed  as  skirmishers.    That  was 
the  force  that  paralyzed  the  action  of  Brown's  veteran  division. 
Cheatham  then  directed  Brown  to  refuse  his  right  brigade  to  pro 
tect  his  flank,  and  to  attack  with  the  rest  of  his  division,  but 
Brown,  still  hesitating,  Cheatham  then  concluded  that  the  force 
holding  Spring  Hill  was  too  strong  for  his  corps  alone  to  attack, 
for  he  reported  to  Hood  that  the  line  in  his  front  was  too  long  for 
him,  and  that  Stewart's  corps  must  first  come  up  and  form  on  his 
right.     But  before  Stewart  could  get  up,  night  had  come. 

It  is  notable  that  Brown's  only  excuse  for  not  attacking  was 
that  he  was  out-flanked  on  his  right,  for  the  claim  has  been  made 
that  Hood  arrived  in  front  of  Spring  Hill  too  late  in  the  day  to 
accomplish  anything,  and  Schofield  himself  has  stated  that  his'  ac 
tion  was  based  on  a  cool  calculation,  made  from  his  intimate  knowl 
edge  of  Hood's  character,  who  had  been  deficient  in  mathematics 
as  a  cadet,  and  could  make  no  accurate  computation  of  the  time  re 
quired  to  overcome  difficulties ;  that  Hood,  marching  by  a  muddy 
country  road,  would  arrive  in  front  of  Spring  Hill  tired,  sleepy, 
and  so  much  later  than  he  had  calculated,  that  he  would  defer  all 
action  until  next  morning.  Between  "shortly  after  daylight," 
when  he  started  from  Duck  river,  and  3  o'clock,  when  "he  had 
crossed  Rutherford's  creek,  Hood  had  ridden  about  ten  miles— 


17 


too  short  a  distance  to  tire  him  out,  and  too  early  in  the  day  to 
become  sleepy.  He  then  sent  forward  Cheatham's  corps  with 
plenty  of  time  before  night  came  for  Cheatham  to  have  made  a 
secure  lodgement  on  the  pike,  or  to  have  run  over  Wagner's  divis 
ion,  the  way  it  was  strung  out,  if  Cleburne's  attack  had  been 
promptly  followed  up  with  anything  like  the  vigor  with  which  he 
had  jumped  on  Bradley 's  brigade.  Hood's  arrival  in  front  of 
Spring  Hill  that  afternoon  was  clearly  a  contingency  unlooked  for 
by  Schofield,  for  it  caught  our  army  in  a  situation  to  leave  no  rea 
sonable  hope  of  escape  without  dire  disaster,  and  Schofield  him 
self,  as  will  appear,  was  thoroughly  frightened  by  the  situation. 
That  his  after-version  of  the  saving  merit  of  his  cool  calculation 
was  fully  accepted  by  the  Administration  is  proved  by  the  promo 
tion  he  was  given,  when,  in  fact,  his  bad  miscalculation  was  re 
sponsible  for  getting  the  army  into  a  trap  from  which  it  escaped 
through  the  failure  of  the  enemy  to  shut  the  door.  Of  the  miracle 
of  that  escape  much  remains  to  be  told.  When  Wagner  was 
coming  to  Spring  Hill  the  26th  Ohio  was  detached  from  the  col 
umn  to  guard  a  country  road  entering  the  pike  more  than  a  mile 
southwest  of  Spring  Hill.  Captain  Kelly,  of  the  26th,  informed 
me  that  the  regiment  was  driven  off  that  evening  by  a  line  of  bat 
tle  so  long  as  to  extend  far  beyond  either  flank  of  the  26th.  That 
was  Bate's  division,  and  after  driving  off  the  26th  there  was  noth 
ing  whatever  to  prevent  Bate  from  sweeping  down  the  pike 
towards  Columbia.  If  he  had  diligently  obeyed  that  order  he 
would  have  progressed  so  far  before  Cheatham's  recall  order 
reached  him  that  he  would  have  met  Ruger  coming  to  Spring  Hill, 
and  then  the  cat  would  have  been  out  of  the  bag.  Bate  declined  to 
obey  Cheatham's  first  order  because  it  conflicted  with  the  order 
direct  from  Hood,  under  which  he  was  acting,  and  Cheatham's 
order  had  to  be  repeated.  When  the  second  order  reached  Bate 
he  was  still  loitering  where  he  had  encountered  the  26th  Ohio. 
He  had  wasted  more  than  an  hour  of  precious  time  in  doing 
nothing,  for  he  had  not  only  disobeyed  Hood's  order  to  sweep 
down  the  pike,  but  he  had  not  even  made  a  lodgement  on  the  pike. 
It  was  then  about  6:30  o'clock,  after  dark,  and  Ruger's  advance 
was  just  coming  along.  First  leaving  orders  for  the  other  divis 
ions  to  follow  after  dark,  about  4 130  o'clock,  Schofield  had  started 
with  Ruger  to  reinforce  Stanley.  Ruger  skirmished  with  Bate 
at  the  place  and  time  indicated,  but  as  Bate  was  off  to  the  east 
side,  instead  of  astride  the  pike,  where,  by  Hood's  order  he  should 
have  been,  Ruger  had  no  difficulty  in  pushing  past  Bate.  Gran- 

18 


bury's  brigade  was  still  lying  behind  the  fence,  close  to  the  pike, 
and  after  passing  Bate,  Rnger  had  to  run  the  gantlet  of  Gran- 
bury's  line.  Granbury  had  been  notified  that  Bate  was  coming 
from  the  left,  and  hearing  Ruger  marching  along  the  pike  in  the 
darkness,  he  mistook  him  for  Bate,  so  that  Schofield  himself, "with 
Ruger,  rode  along  right  under  the  muzzles  of  the  muskets  of 
Granbury's  line,  in  blissful  ignorance  of  the  danger  they  were 
passing.  Captain  English,  Granbury's  assistant  adjutant-general, 
advanced  towards  the  pike  to  investigate,  but  was  captured  by  the 
flankers  covering  the  march  of  Ruger's  column,  belonging  to  the 
23d  Michigan.  Elias  Bartlett  of  the  36th  Illinois,  was  on  picket 
on  the  pike  at  the  bridge  across  the  creek  a  half  mile  south  of 
Spring  Hill,  and  he  informed  me  that  when  Schofield  came  to  his 
post  he  began  eagerly  to  inquire  what  had  happened,  saying  that 
he  had  feared  everything  at  Spring  Hill  had  been  captured ;  that 
while  they  were  talking,  a  Confederate  picket,  near  enough  to 
hear  the  sound  of  their  voices,  fired  on  them,  and  Schofield  then 
rode  on.  A  little  later  Bate  came  up  through  the  fields,  Granbury 
fell  back  from  the  fence  and  Cleburne  and  Bate  then  connected 
and  adjusted  a  new  line  with  Bate's  left  brigade  refused  so  as  to 
face  the  pike  and  all  the  rest  of  their  line  running  across  the 
country  away  from  the  pike. 

Bate  had  utterly  failed  to  grasp  the  significance  of  Ruger's  pass 
age,  claiming  that  his  flank  was  in  danger,  and  his  representations 
to  that  effect  were  so  urgent  that  Johnson's  division  was  brought 
up  between  9  and  10  o'clock  and  posted  on  Bate's  left,  Johnson's 
line  and  the  line  of  Bate's  refused  brigade  paralleling  the  pike  at  a 
distance  of  not  more  than  150  yards.  Many  contradictory  state 
ments  have  been  made  relative  to  the  distance  of  that  part  of  the 
Confederate  line  from  the  pike.  The  owner  of  the  land  pointed 
out  to  me  a  small  plantation  graveyard  as  being  just  inside  their 
line  that  night.  He  said  that  the  position  of  their  line  was  marked, 
after  they  had  gone  in  the  morning,  by  the  rail  barricades  they  had 
built,  and  by  the  remains  of  their  bivouac  fires,  and  he  very  posi 
tively  asserted  that  no  part  of  their  line,  facing  the  pike,  was  dis 
tant  more  than  150  yards  from  the  pike.  All  the  intervening  space 
was  cleared  land.  When  the  divisions  of  Cox,  Wood  and  Kimball 
came  up  from  Duck  river  later  in  the  night,  they  marched  along  un 
molested  within  that  easy  range  of  the  Confederate  line,  and  could 
plainly  see  the  men  around  the  bivouac  fires.  A  staff  officer  was 
stationed  on  the  pike  beyond  Johnson's  left,  where  the  fires  first 
came  into  view,  to  caution  the  troops  as  they  came  up  to  march  by 


the  fires  as  silently  as  possible.  Captain  Bestow,  of  General 
Wood's  staff,  has  related  that  when  the  officer  told  Wood,  riding 
at  the  head  of  his  division,  that  the  long-  line  of  fires  he  could  see 
paralleling  the  pike  so  closely  on  the  right  was  the  bivouac  fires  of 
the  enemy,  the  veteran  Wood  was  so  astounded  that  he  exclaimed : 
"In  God's  name,  no !"  When  they  came  abreast  of  the  fires  one 
of  Wood's  orderlies,  believing  it  to  be  impossible  they  could  be 
the  enemy,  started  to  ride  over  to  one  of  the  fires  to  light  his  pipe, 
but  had  gone  only  a  short  distance  when  he  was  fired  on,  and 
came  galloping  back.  A  colonel  of  Johnson's  division  has  stated 
that  he  held  his  regiment  in  line,  momentarily  expecting  an  order 
to  open  fire,  until  his  men,  one  after  another,  overcome  with 
fatigue,  had  all  dropped  to  the  ground  to  go  to  sleep.  Some  of 
Johnson's  men,  on  their  own  responsibility,  went  out  on  the  pike 
between  the  passage  of  the  different  divisions,  to  capture  strag 
glers  for  the  sake  of  getting  the  contents  of  their  haversacks. 
They  were  the  men  who  made  it  unsafe,  as  reported  by  General 
Stanley,  for  a  staff  officer  or  an  orderly  to  ride  along  the  pike 
when  a  column  of  troops  was  not  passing. 

General  Hood  had  gone  to  bed  in  Thompson's  house  when  he 
was  informed  that  troops  were  marching  along  the  pike.  Without 
getting  out  of  bed  he  directed  Colonel  Mason,  his  chief  of  staff,  to 
send  an  order  to  Cheatham  to  advance  on  the  pike  and  attack,  but 
Mason  admitted  the  next  day,  as  stated  by  Governor  Harris,  of 
Tennessee,  who  was  serving  as  a  volunteer  aide  on  Hood's  staff, 
that  he  never  sent  the  order.  This  strange  neglect  of  the  part  of 
his  own  chief  of  staff  affords  a  fitting  climax  to  all  the  rest  of  the 
imbecility  that  contributed  to  Hood's  failure  after  he  had  person 
ally  led  the  main  body  of  his  army  to  a  position  where  by  all  ordi 
nary  chances  success  should  have  been  certain. 

There  is  a  bit  of  Stanley's  report  that  gives  a  clear  glimpse  of 
the  situation  as  Schofield  and  Stanley  believed  it  to  be  after  they 
had  met  that  night :  "General  Schofield  arrived  from  Columbia 
at  7  o'clock  in  the  evening  with  Ruger's  division.  He  found  the 
enemy  on  the  pike  and  had  quite  a  skirmish  in  driving  them  off. 
My  pickets  had  reported  seeing  rebel  columns  passing,  east  of 
our  position,  as  if  to  get  possession  of  the  hills  at  Thompson's 
Station,  and  the  anxious  question  arose  whether  we  could  force 
our  way  through  to  Franklin.  It  was  determined  to  attempt  this, 
and  General  Schofield  pushed  on  with  Ruger's  division  to  ascer 
tain  the  condition  of  affairs." 


20 


Another  vivid  glimpse  is  afforded  in  the  statement  of  O.  J. 
Hack,  a  conductor  on  the  railroad,  who  was  also  interested  in  a 
store  at  Columbia.     He  came  down  the  road  that  day  on  the  last 
train  southbound,  having  in  charge  some  goods  for  the  store,  and 
at  the  Spring  Hill  station  met  the  last  train  northbound,  and  from 
the  trainmen    learned   that   the   army   was   retreating.      The   two 
trains  stood  at  the  station  that  afternoon.     Some  time  after  dark, 
being  anxious  to  save  his  goods,  Hack  went  over  to  Spring  Hill  in 
quest  of  a  guard  to  run  the  trains  back  to  Franklin.    On  inquiring 
for  headquarters  he  was  directed  to  a  large  brick  house  where  he 
found  Schofield  and  Stanley  together.     Schofield,  recently  arrived 
from  Duck  river,  had  just  been  getting  Stanley's  account  of  the 
situation,  and  Hack  said  that  Schofield  was  in  a  condition  of  great 
agitation,  "walking  the  floor  and  wringing  his  hands."     When 
Hack  had  told  what  he  wanted,  Schofield  sharply  replied  that  the 
enemy  had  possession  of  the  road  north  of  Spring  Hill,  and  the 
trains  could  not  move.     The  report  of  Stanley  and  the  statement 
of  Hack  concur  in  showing  that  it  was  then  SchofieM's  belief  that 
Hood  had  possession  of  the  Franklin  pike ;  that  the  army  was 
caught  in  a  trap ;  that  the  only  way  out  was  the  desperate  expe 
dient  of  forcing  a  passage  by  a  night  attack,  and,  failing  in  that, 
he  must  fight  a  battle  next  day  under  so  many  disadvantages  that 
ruinous  defeat,  with  the  probable  loss  of  the  army,  was  staring 
him  in  the  face.     It  would  be  interesting  to  know  what  Schofield 
then  thought  about  his  intimate  knowledge  of  Hood's  character, 
and  his  cool  calculation  based  thereon,  for  which  he  afterwards 
so  unblushingly  claimed  so  much  credit. 

The  two  trains  stood  at  the  station  until  daylight  was  beginning 
to  dawn  when  a  detail  of  men  came  and  began  to  build  fires  to 
burn  the  cars,  but  the  detail  was  driven  away,  and  the  fires  were 
extinguished  before  much  damage  was  done,  by  the  advance  of  the 
enemy.  The  two  trains  thus  captured  afforded  the  transportation 
to  which  Hood  alluded  in  a  letter  to  Richmond,  written  when  he 
was  in  front  of  Nashville,  wherein  he  stated  that  he  had  captured 
enough  transportation  to  make  use  of  the  railroad  in  bringing  up 
supplies.  But  Schofield  ignored  the  loss  of  the  two  trains,  for,  in 
his  official  report,  he  explicitly  states  that  with  the  exception  of  a 
few  wagons,  and  of  a  few  cattle  that  were  stampeded,  he  arrived 
at  FrankHn  without  any  loss. 

When  Schofield  "pushed  on  with  Ruger's  division  to  ascertain 
the  condition  of  affairs,"  on  his  arrival  at  Thompson's  Station, 
three  miles  north  of  Spring  Hill,  he  found  camp  fires  still  burn- 

21 


ing,  but  the  brigade  of  cavalry  that  had  been  in  possession  there, 
withdrew  without  making  any  resistance.  This  very  considerate 
action  on  the  part  of  the  cavalry  was  another  of  those  lucky  fatali 
ties  that  so  notably  contributed  to  the  escape  of  our  army  when 
such  .special  fatalities  were  a  vital  necessity  for  its  escape.  After 
posting  Ruger  there  to  hold  the  cross  roads  Schofield  returned  to 
Spring  Hill,  where  he  arrived  about  midnight  at  the  same  time 
with  the  advance  of  Cox's  division  coming  from  Duck  river. 
With  this  division  he  then  hurried  through  to  Franklin,  picking 
up  Rnger  as  he  passed  along,  and  thus  saddling  Stanley  with  all 
the  risk  of  saving  the  artillery  and  the  trains. 

If  they  had  been  lost  Stanley  would  have  been  the  scapegoat, 
but  with  the  same  skill  with  which  that  afternoon  he  had  bluffed 
off  ten-twelfths  o'f  Hood's  army  with  a  single  division,  Stanley 
that  night  saved  the  artillery  and  the  trains.  At  3  o'clock  in  the 
morning,  when  only  a  part  of  the  trains  had  pulled  out,  the  long 
column  on  the  pike  was  brought  to  a  standstill  by  an  attack  some 
place  in  front.  The  situation  was  so  critical  that  General  Wood, 
who  was  then  with  Stanley,  believing  it  would  be  impossible  to 
save  both  troops  and  trains,  advised  that  the  trains  be  abandoned. . 
But  Stanley  persevered  until  the  attack  was  beaten  off  and  the 
column  again  in  motion.  The  two  trains  of  cars  had  to  be  aban 
doned  because  a  bridge  had  been  destroyed  north  of  the  station, 
and  about  forty  wagons  were  lost  in  the  attacks  made  by  Forrest 
between  Thompson's  Station  and  Franklin.  Everything  else  was 
saved. 

And,  by  the  way,  Stanley  was  one  of  the  many  good  soldiers 
who  were  overslaughed  by  the  big  promotion  obtained  by  Scho 
field.  Stanley  outranked  Schofield,  both  as  a  captain  in  the  regular 
army  and  as  a  major-general  of  volunteers,  but  by  assignment  of 
the  President,  gained  by  his  extraordinary  ability  in  the  arts  of 
diplomacy  instead  of  by  fighting  ability  displayed  on  the  battle 
field,  Schofield  was  a  department  commander  while  Stanley  was  a 
corps  commander,  and  it  thus  happened  that  Stanley  was  serving 
under  his  junior  in  rank. 

Wagner's  division  was  the  last  to  leave  Spring  Hill.  When 
night  came  Bradley 's  brigade  began  to  intrench  the  line  it  was  on, 
and  kept  at  this  work  until  nearly  midnight  when  the  men  were 
called  under  arms,  and  spent  all  the  remainder  of  that  anxious, 
weary  night  on  their  feet.  While  standing  in  column  we  could 
hear  to  our  left  the  rumble  of  the  wheels  while  the  artillery  and 
the  wagons  were  pulling  out,  and  much  of  the  time  could  be  heard 

22 


the  dull  tread  of  many  feet  and  the  clicking  of  accoutrements 
that  told  of  the  march  of  a  column  of  troops  along  the  pike,  but 
there  was"  no  other  sound — not  even  the  shout  of  a  teamster  to  his 
mules  or  the  crack  of  a  whip.  All  the  surroundings  were  so  im 
pressive  as  to  subdue  the  most  boisterously  profane  men:  In  ex 
pressing  their  dissatisfaction  with  the  situation  they  were  always 
careful  to  mutter  their  curses  in  a  tone  so  low  as  to  be  inaudible 
a  short  distance  away,  for,  looking  to  our  right,  we  could  see  the 
glow  on  the  sky  made  by  the  bivouac  fires  of  the  enemy,  and  in 
some  places  could  see  the  fires  with  a  few  men  about  them  cooking  ' 
something  to  eat,  or  otherwise  engaged,  while  most  of  their  men 
were  lying  on  the  ground  asleep.  Every  minute  of  those  anxious 
hours  we  were  looking  for  them  to  awake  to  the  opportunity  that 
was  slipping  through  their  fingers  and  grab  hold  of  it  by  advanc 
ing  and  opening  fire  on  the  congested  mass  of  troops  and  trains 
that  choked  the  pike.  Occasionally  our  column  would  move  on 
a  short  distance.  Any  orders  that  may  have  been  given  were 
spoken  in  a  low  tone  at  the  head  of  the  column.  You  would  be 
apprised  that  the  column  was  moving  by  the  silent  disappearance 
in  the  darkness  of  your  file  leader.  You  would  hurry  after  him, 
and  taking,  perhaps,  not  more  than  a  dozen  steps,  would  be 
brought  to  a  sudden  halt  by  running  against  him,  immediately 
followed  by  the  man  in  your  rear  bumping  up  against  yourself. 
Then  would  follow  an  indefinite  wait  until  the  column  would 
again  move  on  a  short  distance.  The  wearing  suspense  of  the 
long  waiting,  while  standing  on  our  feet;  the  exasperating  halts 
following  those  false  starts,  when  everybody  was  almost  frantic 
with  impatience  to  go  on;  the  excessive  physical  fatigue,  com 
bined  with  the  intense  mental  strain  when  already  haggard  from 
much  loss  of  sleep  during  the  three  days  and  nights  preceding, 
make  that  night  memorable  as  by  far  the  most  trying  in  nearly 
four  years  of  soldiering.  It  afforded  unspeakable  relief  when, 
just  as  daylight  was  beginning  to  dawn,  our  column  finally  got 
away  in  rapid  motion  for  Franklin,  the  enemy  dogging  our  heels 
with  their  close  pursuit. 

The  location  of  Hood's  headquarters  was  central  as  to  the  posi 
tion  of  his  troops  until  nightfall,  and  was,  therefore,  a  proper  one. 
But  he  was  too  far  away  to  get  any  personal  knowledge  as  to  what 
was  going  on  at  Spring  Hill,  and  he  had  to  rely  on  the  reports  of 
his  subordinates  who  were  in  contact  with  our  troops.  The  char 
acter  of  those  reports  is  unmistakably  indicated  by  the  second 
move  that  Hood  made.  His  first  move,  as  has  been  shown,  was 

23 


based  on  the  correct  theory  that  a  part  of  Schofield's  army  was  at 
Spring  Hill  and  a  part  at  Duck  river,  and  it  contemplated  thrust 
ing  in  Cheatham's  corps  between  those  two  parts.  His  second 
move,  made  after  the  fighting  was  all  over,  and  he  had  received 
the  reports  of  that  fighting,  was  based  on  the  theory  that  all  of 
Schofield's  army  had  reached  Spring  Hill,  for,  abandoning  all  pur 
pose  of  cutting  off  any  part  south  of  Spring  Hill,  it  contemplated 
seizing  the  pike  north  of  Spring  Hill  and  cutting  off  Schofield's 
retreat  to  Franklin. 

Between  sunset  and  dark,  as  stated  by  General  Stewart,  which 
would  be  about  5  o'clock  at  that  season  of  the  year,  he  received 
orders  to  cross  Rutherford's  creek  with  his  corps,  to  pass  to  the 
right  of  Cheatham's  corps,  and  to  extend  his  right  across  the 
Franklin  pike.  After  about  five  hours  Stewart  finally  went  into 
bivouac  with  his  right  more  than  a  mile  away  from  the  Franklin 
pike.  His  explanations  for  his  failure  were  the  lack  of  a  compe 
tent  guide,  the  darkness  of  the  night,  and  the  fatigue  of  his  men. 
To  accomplish  Hood's  orders  required  a  march  of  a  little  less  than 
four  miles  by  Stewart's  head  of  column — about  three  miles  by  a 
direct  country  road  leading  into  the  Mount  Carmel  road,  and  the 
remaining  distance  across  the  country  lying  between  the  Mount 
Carmel  road  and  the  Franklin  pike.  It  would  seem  that  a  guide 
might  have  been  found  among  the  cavalry  who  had  explored  the 
country  that  afternoon  in  developing  the  position  of  our  line  be 
tween  the  Mount  Carmel  road  and  the  railway  station,  west  of 
the  Franklin  pike ;  or  there  were  men  in  some  of  the  Tennessee 
regiments  whose  homes  were  in  that  vicinity,  who  were  thoroughly 
familiar  with  the  ground.  That  no  great  difficulties  were  involved 
in  the  march  is  proved  by  the  fact  that  Johnson's  division  made  a 
similar  march  in  about  two  hours,  later  in  the  night,  to  get  into 
position  on  Bate's  left.  The  night  was  as  dark,  the  men  were  as 
tired,  the  distance  was  as  great,  and  the  way  was  as  difficult  for 
Johnson  as  for  Stewart.  In  view  of  these  plain  facts  it  is  a  fair 
inference  that  Stewart  made  a  very  lukewarm  effort  to  accomplish 
Hood's  orders ;  that  it  was  possible  for  him,  by  a  display  of  no 
more  energy  than  Johnson  displayed,  to  have  extended  his  right 
across  the  Franklin  pike  as  early  as  8  o'clock,  and  then  when 
Schofield  started  north  with  Ruger's  division  about  9  o'clock,  he 
would  have  found  the  way  effectually  barred: 

The  prime  cause  of  Hood's  failure  was  apparently  the  lack  of 
confidence  in  his  generalship  on  the  part  of  so  many  of  his  subor 
dinates.  They  had  been  dissatisfied  with  his  appointment  to  the 

24 


command  of  the  army,  and  their  dissatisfaction  had  been  greatly 
increased  by  the  failure  of  his  attacks  on  Sherman's  lines  in  front 
of  Atlanta.  With  the  poor  opinion  they  held  of  Hood's  ability  it 
was  not  possible  for  them  to  give  to  any  plan  of  his  that  whole 
hearted,  unquestioning  support  that  gives  the  best  guarantee  of 
success.  Simple  as  his  plan  was,  they  all  failed  to  grasp  the  im 
portance  of  getting  possession  of  the  pike  and,  Cleburne  excepted, 
they  all  acted  as  if  they  were  expecting  a  repetition  of  the  disas 
trous  experience  that  had  followed  the  attacks  on  Sherman.  The 
promptness  with  which  Cleburne  turned  and  rolled  up  Bradley's 
brigade  when  he  was  so  unexpectedly  assailed  on  his  own  flank, 
was  the  only  energetic  action  on  the  part  of  any  of  them  after 
they  had  crossed  Rutherford's  creek;  and,  no  doubt,  if  Cleburne 
had  not  been  halted  by  Cheatham's  order,  he  would  have  gone  on 
until  he  had  reaped  the  full  measure  of  success  made  so  easily 
possible  by  the  faulty  situation  of  our  army.  But  amid  all  the 
exciting  occurrences  of  that  eventful  evening  it  is  amazing  that 
no  inkling  of  that  faulty  situation  seems  ever  to  have  entered  the 
mind  of  any  one  of  those  veteran  generals. 

Hood  made  a  mistake,  as  stated  by  himself,  in  not  taking  Lee's 
corps  on  the  flank  march  instead  of  Cheatham's  corps.  He  be 
lieved  that  with  Lee  in  Cheatham's  place  he  would  have  succeeded, 
and  in  view  of  the  skill  with  which  Lee  executed  the  part  assigned 
to  him  to  hold  Schofield  at  Duck  river,  it  is  more  than  probable 
he  would  have  given  at  Spring  Hill  far  better  support  than  Cheat- 
ham  gave.  Hood  led  Cheatham  within  sight  of  an  easy  and  bril 
liant  success,  and  it  was  the  hesitation  displayed  by  Cheatham, 
Brown  and  Bate  at  the  critical  time,  that  defeated  Hood's  plan 
and  saved  Schofield's  army.  That  their  hesitation  was  not  due  to 
any  lack  of  courage  on  their  part,  or  on  the  part  of  the  troops  they 
commanded,  was  abundantly  proved  by  the  unsurpassed  courage 
with  which  they  assaulted  at  Franklin  next  day  when  it  was  ever 
lastingly  too  late.  If  they  had  fairly  utilized  at  Spring  Hill  one- 
tenth  part  of  the  courage  that  was  thrown  away  on  the  breast 
works  of  Franklin  they  would  have  changed  the  later  current  of 
the  war  with  results  too  far  reaching  to  be  estimated. 

The  prime  purpose  of  Schofield's  campaign  was  to  delay  Hood. 
How  well  he  succeeded  in  that  purpose  can  be  significantly  stated 
in  a  single  sentence :  The  evening  of  November  29th  he  was  at 
Duck  river,  and  the  morning  of  December  1st  he  was  at  Nashville, 
more  than  forty  miles  away.  Then  followed  the  panicky  feeling 
displayed  by  the  Administration,  and  by  General  Grant,  because 

25 


General  Thomas  was  not  ready  to  attack  Hood  immediately  on 
his  appearance  in  front  of  Nashville.  If  Schofield's  orders  at 
Duck  river  had  been  to  make  no  effort  to  delay  Hood  but  to  get 
inside  the  fortifications  of  Nashville  with  the  least  possible  delay, 
he  would  not  have  covered  the  distance  in  so  short  a  time  without 
the  spur  of  Hood's  flank  movement,  and  the  celerity  with  which  he 
ran  out  of  the  country  was  due  to  the  scare  he  got  at  Spring  Hill. 
From  Franklin  next  day  he  wired  General  Thomas  at  Nash 
ville  that  he  had  come  through,  but  that  the  least  mistake  on  his 
part,  or  the  fault  of  any  subordinate,  might  have  proved  fatal,  and 
he  did  not  want  to  get  into  such  a  tight  place  again ;  that  a  worse 
position  for  an  inferior  force  than  the  one  at  Franklin  could  hardly 
be  found ;  that  he  had  no  doubt  Forrest  would  be  in  his  rear  next 
day,  or  doing  some  worse  mischief,  and  that  he  ought  to  fall  back 
to  Brentwood  at  once.  In  short,  his  Franklin  dispatches,  read  by 
the  light  of  Stanley's  report  and  of  Hack's  statement,  clearly  show 
that  his  mind  was  still  dominated  by  the  fright  of  Spring  Hill, 
and  that  he  could  feel  no  security  short  of  Brentwood,  where  he 
would  be  backed  up  too  close  to  Nashville  for  Hood  to  have  room 
to  repeat  that  terrible  flank  movement.  Not  even  the  wrecking  of 
Hood's  army  on  the  breastworks  of  Franklin  that  evening  could 
reassure  Schofield.  He  insisted  on  retreating  to  Nashville  that 
night  when  thousands  of  the  men  were  in  such  a  condition  from 
more  than  forty  hours'  of  incessant  marching,  fortifying  and 
fighting  that  they  dozed  on  their  feet  while  they  were  walking, 
and  in  spite  of  the  manly  protest  of  General  Cox,  who  was  so 
urgent  in  his  efforts  to  persuade  Schofield  no  more  running  was 
necessary,  that  he  offered  to  pledge  his  head  he  could  hold  the 
position. 


26 


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